BYU Law Review
Volume 1994 | Issue 2

Article 9

5-1-1994

Kiss of Death: Application of Title VII's Prohibition
Against Religious Discrimination in the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia
James D. Phipps

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Religion Law Commons
Recommended Citation
James D. Phipps, Kiss of Death: Application of Title VII's Prohibition Against Religious Discrimination in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
1994 BYU L. Rev. 399 (1994).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1994/iss2/9

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Kiss of Death: Application of Title VII's
Prohibition Against Religious Discrimination i n
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
I. INTRODUCTION:
WILLTHE FOREIGN
LAW
MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
EXCEPTION
Last spring a friend, Pete,' applied for a position with a
U.S. firm doing business in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia? The
ideal candidate for this position had to possess an unusual
range of professional, technical and cultural experience. Pete's
resume made him the ideal candidate. He spoke French and
English and, as an additional bonus, also spoke Arabic-a
language he acquired some years earlier while serving in the
U.S. military. He had an undergraduate degree magna cum
laude from Brigham Young University and the requisite number of years work experience in the field. His track record with
previous employers was solid. Upon considering these credentials, the interviewer from this firm told Pete he was a strong
candidate for the job.
As he worked his way down Pete's resume, however, the
interviewer's attitude began to change. Slowly but noticeably,
the look on his face went from one of interest t o one of concern.
The furrows on his forehead deepened. He hesitated, took a
breath, and then uneasily advanced this question: 'You graduated from BYU. You speak two languages other than English.
You seem to fit the profile of an ex-Mormon missionary. You
wouldn't happen t o be a Mormon would you?"
'Yes, I am a Mormon," Pete replied.
"And did you chance to go on one of those two year missions for the Mormon Church?"

1. "Pete" has consented to my telling his story in this forum on condition
that facts be altered to conceal identities of concerned parties. Quoted material hiis
not, however, been altered, but is taken directly from the conversation on which
this story is based.
2. For present purposes, it doesn't matter greatly which of the Arab Gulf
States it was, since every one of these states is profoundly committed to Islam.
And, the point I make with this anecdote (and in this Comment, more generally)
regards Title VII implications of doing business in countries profoundly committed
to Islam.
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'Well, yes I did. But what are you driving at?" Pete wondered aloud.
I n response, the interviewer explained that another Western firm doing business in the Kingdom had recently suffered
what might in business terms amount to "the kiss of deatW3
after a U.S. employee with evangelical Christian convictions
gave a Bible to a Muslim co-worker. When authorities discovered this . . . well, to put it mildly, it wasn't pleasant for anyone. "Not very good for business, you understand," the interviewer observed, "not very good at all."
Pete quickly agreed and assured the interviewer that
among the things he learned on his religious mission was when
and how to avoid the subject of religion and that he would do
nothing to compromise the firm's position in the Kingdom.
Happily, Pete was convincing on this point and went on to secure the position. But Pete's job-hunting success is not the
point here. The point here is simple: U.S. employers of U.S.
employees working in profoundly Islamic countries sometimes
find compelling reasons to discriminate on the basis of religion
i n their employment practices.
Nevertheless, we may wonder what would have happened
had Pete not only failed to secure the position, but had the firm
hired a less qualified, less religiously objectionable candidate.
Had this happened, Pete could have filed a claim against the
firm under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19914 (Title
VI1)-an
act which prohibits U.S. employers from discriminating on the basis of religion in their hiring practices. Filing such
a claim, however, might raise this question: Can U.S. employers discriminate on the basis of religion when hiring U.S. employees i n the United States for work in countries with unique
or heightened religious sensitivities? Or, more generally, under
what circumstances and to what extent may U.S. employers
claim exception to Title VII's extraterritorial application? For
answers to Title VII extraterritorial application questions such
as these, we may, as this Comment does, look to Title VII's
foreign law e ~ c e p t i o n . ~
possible
This Comment considers the usefulness-and
uselessness-of Title VII's foreign law exception, particularly i n
the context of religiously motivated Title W-violative policies
3. Hence, my title.
4. 42 U.S.C. $8 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. 1992).
5 . Id. $ 2000e(f).

KISS OF DEATH

3991

401

and practices involving a profoundly Islamic country, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. First, this Comment provides a brief
historical overview of Title VII, its extraterritorial application,
and the foreign law exception to that application. It also provides, by way of example, a n overview of the law of the Kingdom, with a particular view to understanding how that law
compares with Title VII in matters related to religious discrimination. This Comment then illustrates difficulties in applying
the foreign law exception with three hypotheticals. Each hypothetical is factually connected with the Kingdom and the foreign law exception's failure to fiilfill its functions-functions
that include: (1) protecting U.S. employers of expatriate U.S.
employees from unpreventable and indefensible Title VII
claims, (2) avoiding offensive application of U.S. law beyond
U.S. borders, and (3) forestalling accusations of U.S. cultural
imperialism. Finally, this Comment briefly considers possible
legislative reformulations of Title VII's foreign law exception.

11. BRIEF OVERVIEW
OF TITLEVII: EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION
AND THE FOREIGN
LAW EXCEPTION
To advance the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment,6 to remedy past discrimination on the basis of
religion, national origin, gender, race, and color, and to discourage future like discrimination in both public life and the private sector, Congress passed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.' I n passing Title VII, Congress created a federal claim
against U.S. employers who discriminate in their employment
policies and practices on the basis of religion, national origin,
gender, race or color.'
Title VII recognizes that, under appropriate circumstances,
religion, national origin, and gender may serve as bona fide

XIV, 3 1.
7. 42 U.S.C. $3 2000e-el7 (1988).
8. Id. In a Title VII action, the claimant files a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Id. $ 2000e-5@). The EEOC is a governmental agency created especially for the purpose of handling employment discrimination claims. Id. $ 2000e-4. Once the claimant files a claim with the EEOC,
the EEOC may investigate, facilitate conciliation between claimant and employer
and, if conciliation fails, litigate the claim on behalf of the claimant. Id. 3 2000e5@). Alternatively, the EEOC can give the claimant a letter declaring the
claimant's right to sue directly. Id. 2000e-5(f). Potential claimants under Title VII
may include persons seeking employment by discriminatory employers as well as
persons already, or at one time, employed by discriminatory employers.
6. U.S. CONST.amend
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occupational qualifications (BFOQ).' For example, a Mennonite
church in Central California looking to hire a new pastor may
discriminate against pastors of other faiths by excluding them
from the hiring process, if such an exclusion would be "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular. . .
enterprise."1° But, the Mennonite church could not discriminate against, say, a n African-American or a n Asian-American
pastor of the Mennonite faith on BFOQ grounds, since the
BFOQ exception does not allow discrimination on the basis of
race or color." And, i n any case, one must remember that the
BFOQ exception has been integrated as "an extremely narrow
exception to the general prohibition against dis~rimination."'~
Until 1991, whether expatriate U.S. employees of U.S.
employers were entitled to the protections of Title VII was
unclear.13 In 1991, however, the Supreme Court held that,
absent a n express legislative statement authorizing Title VII's
extraterritorial application, Title VII would be limited in scope
to discrimination occurring within the territorial jurisdiction of
t h e United States.14 This meant, for example, that a U.S. citizen employed by a U.S. employer and working in the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia would not be allowed to recover for his
employer's religiously motivated employment discrimination.15
During that same year, however, the express legislative state-

-

p
p

-

9. Id. 8 2000e-2(e) (providing that "it shall not be an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to hire and employ . . . on the basis of his [or her] religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise").
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 355 (1977).
13. See generally Jonathan Turley, T h e n in Rome": Multinational Misconduct
and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 598 (1990);
Janelle M. Diller, Note, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Multinational Enterprise, 73 GEO.L. J. 1465 (1985); Adam M. Mycyk, Comment, United

States Fair Employment Law in the Transnational Employment Arena: The Case for
the Extraterritorial Application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 39
CATH.U. L. REV. 1109 (1990).
14. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian American Oil Co.
(ARAMCO), 499 US. 244 (1991). For discussion of this holding see Keith Highet &
George Kahale 111, International Decision: Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n
v. Arabian American Oil Co., 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 552 (July 1991); Robert A.
LaBerge & Thomas G. Eron, Employment Law, 43 SYRACUSEL. REV. 295, 302
(1992); Louise Weinberg, Against Comity, 80 GEO.L. REV. 53, 73-76 (1991); The
Supreme Court, 1990 Term: Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177, 369-79 (1991).
15. ARAMCO, 499 U.S. a t 244.
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ment the Court was looking for but found missing in the 1964
version of Title VII-a statement indicating Congress' clear
intent t o make Title VII applicable abroad-was included in
the 1991 version of Title VII.16
Realizing the difficulties Title WI's extraterritorial application might present, Congress provided an exception-the foreign law exception." Congress commanded U.S. employers of
expatriate U.S employees to comply with Title VII, except when
compliance would cause the U.S. employer to violate the laws
of the foreign country in which its U.S. employees work.''
Does the foreign law exception, as formulated here, address the kinds of difficulties U.S. employers of expatriate U.S.
employees faced prior to 1991, i.e., prior to Congress making
Title VII extraterritorially applicable? As this Comment will
point out, the foreign law exception apparently ignores at least
two significant questions U.S. employers of expatriate U.S.
employees faced prior to 1991: first, whether the U.S. employer
may, with the blessings of the exception, implement Title VIIviolative policies or practices in order to prevent U.S. employees from themselves breaking the laws of the foreign country in
which they work;19 and second, whether the foreign law exception applies t o a U.S. employer's Title VII-violative policies or
practices which occur entirely within the territorial boundaries
of the United States, but which are aimed exclusively a t pre16. 42 U.S.C. 8 2000e(f) (1988 & Supp. 1992) (defining "employee" as a U.S.
citizen who works "in a foreign country" under the employ of a U.S. employer); see
also Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Joyner v.
Monier Roof Tile, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Comerly v. CVN Companies, 785 F. Supp. 810 (D. Minn. 1992) (each noting that ARAMCO was superseded by the 1991 update to Title VII).
17. 42 U.S.C. 8 2000e-l(b) (Supp. 1992).
18. 42 U.S.C. 8 2000e-16) (Supp. 1992) states:
It shall not be unlawful [under the sections of Title VII which regulate
employment practices] for an employer (or a corporation controlled by an
employer), labor organization, employment agency or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining
(including on-the-job training programs) to take any action otherwise prohibited by such section, with respect to an employee in a workplace in a
foreign country if compliance with such section would cause such employer (or such corporation), such organization, such agency, or such committee to violate the law of the foreign country in which such workplace is
located.
In other words, if compliance with Title VII would mean that the US. employer would be in violation of the work-site country's laws, then the U.S. employer is
excused from compliance with Title VII. Id.
19. See, e.g., Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
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venting the violation of the laws of the foreign country i n which
A third defithe U.S. employee works or is to be ~tationed.~'
ciency in the foreign law exception, a deficiency perhaps not
adequately suggested by relevant jurisprudence, is the
exception's exclusive focus on foreign 'law." Surely, U.S. employers require the flexibility to take account of significant nonlegal factors, such as prevailing culture, morality, andlor tradition, when formulating company policy regarding foreign operations, especially when these non-legal factors, at least for
practicle purposes, carry the weight of law.21
By recourse to three hypotheticals, this Comment will
analyze the foreign law exception's failure to address these
three questions. Because all three hypotheticals are factually
connected with the Kingdom, a brief overview of the law of the
Kingdom, especially as regards religious commitments and
discrimination, will at this point prove useful.
111. THE LAWOF THE KINGDOMOF SAUDIARABIA AND
RELIGIOUS
DISCRIMINATION:.
A BRIEFOVERVIEW
The Kingdom is, according to its recently promulgated
Basic S ~ s t e r n : ~governed by the Shari'a ("the Islamic law"),"(
20. See, e.g., Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir.
1986).
21. Another deficiency in the foreign law exception, one that will not be firther addressed in this Comment, but which nonetheless deserves mention, is the
exception's failure to limit its scope to discriminatory situations involving only
religion, national origin or gender. Suffice it to say here, that, for the same reasons Congress expressly prohibited use of the BFOQ exception in cases involving
discrimination based race or color, it should probably also have prohibited use of
the foreign law exception in cases involving discrimination based on race or color.
22. THE BASICSYSTEMOF GOVERNMENT
OF THE KINGDOM
OF SAUDIARABIA,
Royal Decree No. A190 (Sha'ban 27, 1412; March 1, 1992) [hereinafter BASIC
SYSYTEM];see also Saudi Basic Law of Government Issued, SPA & BBC SUMMARY
OF WORLDBROADCASTS(British Broadcast Corp. March 3, 1992) available in
LEXIS, MDEAFR Library, TEXTLINE File. For his interpretations of the Basic
System, the author relies exclusively on the official Arabic text, generously provided to him by the Office of Legal Counsel at the Royal Saudi Embassy in Washington, D.C.
For commentary on the Kingdom's new Basic System see Rashed Aba-Namay,
The Recent Constitutional Reforms in Saudi Arabia, 42 INT'L & COMP.L.Q. 295
(1993); A. Michael Tarazi, Note, Saudi Arabia's New Basic Laws: me Struggle for
Participatory Islamic Government, 34 HARV.
INTI L.J. 258 (1993).
arts. 8 & 23. The Shari'a encompasses an extremely broad
23. BASIC SYSTEM
range of legal topics-family, property, personal injury, and criminal law, to name
but a few. While the content of the Shari'a is relatively predictable in some matters, a more profound analysis shows that the Shari'a is a process, a jurisprudential methodology developed during the Middle Ages and intended, not as a defm-
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a law deduced some eleven centuries ago from the Holy Qur'an
and the sunna ("tradition") of the Prophet M u h a m ~ n e d ~ ~
(pb~h).~~
We sent down to you the Book which possesses the Truth so
that you could judge between people according to that which
Allah has shown you . . . .26
No, by your Lord, they believe not until they make you
[Muhammed (pbuh)]judge in all disputes that arise between
them and find no resistance in their souls against your judgments, accepting them ~ h o l e h e a r t e d l ~ . ~ ~

itive list of offenses, but as a guide to al-Qadi ("the judge") in the determination of
legal questions. The Shari'a is not a code of offenses. It does not concern itself
with stare decisis. See David J. Karl, Note, Islamic Law in Saudi Arabia: What the
Foreign Attorney Should Know, 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.131 (1991)
(discussing the Shari'a process as applied in the Kingdom). The Shari'a is much
less tangible than a civil code or common law-stare decisis legal regime.
24. There are five recognized primary sources of Shari'a. They are known as
usul al-fiqh ("origins of understanding" or "of jurisprudence"). They include: (1) the
Holy Qur'an, the literal word of Allah as revealed to Muhammed (pbuh) which is,
therefore, the highest and most authoritative source of law; (2) the sunna of the
Prophet (pbuh), which includes huda'ith ("sayingsm)-which vary widely in authenticity and, therefore, in authority-about the life of the Prophet (pbuh); (3) al-ijma'
("the consensus" of the Muslim nation), a source of law which, it is said, if based
(4) al-qiyas ("the analogy")-an analogue method of
t
on true unity, c a ~ o error;
deriving legal theories from the above sources; and, finally, (5) al-ijtihud ("the
striving" or "the endeavor"), a struggle for understanding in accordance with the
first three sources. It is, of course, beyond the scope of this Comment to say much
more than this about these sources of the Shari'a. For a more dtetailed account of
Shari'a sources see generally ABDULLAHI AHMEDAN-NA'IM,TOWARD
AN ISLAMIC
REFORMATION
(1990); S.H. AMIN,MIDDLEEASTLEGALSYSTEMS
325-27 (1985); N.J.
COULSON,
A HISTORYOF ISLAMIC
LAW(1964); THE ISLAMIC
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
SYSTEM (bf. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 1982); ISLAMIC
LAWAND JURISPRUDENCE
(Nicholas
CONTEXTS (Aziz Al-Azmeh
LAW:SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL
Heer ed., 1990); ISLAMIC
ed., 1989); MATTHEW LIPPMAN
ET AL., ISLAMICCRIMINAL
LAWAND PROCEDURE: A N
INTRODUCTION
(1988).
25. "Pbuh" is an abbreviated form of the Arabic invocation sala allahi 'alai he
wa sallim, meaning "may Allah's peace and prayers be upon him." To the ear of
the Muslim, it is a sign of irreverence to mention the name of the Prophet
Muhammed (pbuh) or that of any of the other holy men of the Judeo-Christian
tradition (pbut) without uttering this invocation. This Comment will offer this invocation wherever appropriate both as a sign of reverence for the Prophet (pbuh) and
as an expression of respect for Muslim etiquette.
26. HOLYQUR'AN4:105. All quotations from the Holy Qur'an are based on
the author's own translation. For alternative translations, see THE HOLYQUR'AN:
AND COMMENTARY
('Abdullah Yusuf 'Ali, trans. 1989); THE
TEXT, TRANSLATION
QUR'AN(Muhammad Zafrulla Khan, trans. 1991). While these texts provide alternative translations, it must be noted that the only authentic language for Qur'anic
interpretation and discourse is, of course, Arabic.
27. HOLYQUR'AN4:65.

406

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 11994

The Shari'a may properly be understood as being generally
geared to discriminate on the basis of religion. Under it, there
are Muslims and there are non-Muslims; the former are to be
prefemed and the latter tolerated, but only if submissive to
Islamic rule and custom.28More specifically, under the Shari'a
t h e r e a r e n o n - M u s l i m s who a r e "People of t h e
B~ok"~~-Christiansand Jews-and there are non-Muslims
who are "People of the Fire"30-atheists, pagans, and idolaters
(or all non-Muslims who are not either Christians or J e ~ s ) . ~ '
Again, the Holy Qur'an prefers submissive People of the Book
to submissive People of the Fire.32 In short, and in contradis28. From the first days of the Islamic Revelation some thirteen centuries ago,
Muslims have faced the question of how to treat the unbelievers living in their
midst. In response to this question, the Prophet Muhammed (pbuh) directed Muslims to
[flight those among the People of the Book who do not believe in Allah,
[who do not believe] in the Last Day, who do not forsake what Allah and
His Prophet forbid, and who do not abide in the True Religion . . . until
such a time as they submissively render the jizyah.
HOLYQUR'AN9:29. The jizyah was a poll tax that non-converting Christians and
Jews paid in token of their willing submission to Islamic rule and custom. See
&BEE~T HOURANI,A HISTORYOF THE ARAB PEOPLES 35, 134, 139-40, 217-218
(1992) (noting that, whereas Muslims paid no regular taxes, non-converting Christians and Jews were made to pay a poll tax-jizyah-from
the earliest days of the
spread of Islam). Christians and Jews who not only failed to convert to Islam, but
who also failed to submit to Islamic rule and custom by willingly paying the jizyah
were to be treated as enemies.
In more recent times, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, "a sovereign Arab Islamic
state," has asked itself the same question-how properly to treat the unbelievers
within its borders. BASIC SYSTEM
art. 1. Following the cue of the Prophet, the
Kingdom takes the approach of treating unbelievers within its boarders with kindness and justice, so long as they submit to Islamic rule and custom; for "Allah
does not forbid you from treating with kindness and justice those who do not fight
with you over religion . . . for Allah loves those who are just." HOLYQUR'AN60:8.
This is not to say that the unbeliever who refuses to submit to Islamic rule and
custom will be treated unkindly or with injustice while in the Kingdom (although
some reports indicate the contrary). The disrespectful unbeliever, the unbeliever
who fails to abide by the Kingdom's Islamic laws or who fails to observe the Islamic values of Saudi society, will be invited to leave. See, BASICSYSTEMart. 41
(requiring non-citizen residents to abide the laws, observe the values, and respect
the traditions of Islamic Saudi society).
29. HOLYQUR'AN5:12-18.
30. See, e.g., HOLYQUR'AN9:113 (defining "People of the Fire").
31. HOLYQUR'AN5:82 (informing the Muslim that "[ylou will find that the
strongest in enmity towards those who have believed are Jews and idolaters, also,
you will find that closest to those who have believed are ' Christians, among whom
are learned and pious persons who are not arrogant").
32. HOLYQUR'AN9:3-4. In practice, and for regional, geo-political, and historical reasons, the Kingdom has made a point of discriminating against Jews even
though they are People of the Book. If the Israeli-Palestinian peace process suc-

KISS OF DEATH
tinction to the purposes of Title VII, the Holy Qur'an expressly
identifies discrimination on the basis of religion as a divine
commandment. "Oh you who believe, take not in except your
own kind; for [the unbelievers] will spare nothing to corrupt
you. They wish for your destruction. The aspersions of their
mouths [against you] have already been manifest and what is
yet hidden in their bosoms is worse still . . . ."33 The Kingdom
strictly obeys this ~ o m m a n d m e n t . ~ ~

ceeds, this kind of discrimination may begin slowly to subside. Already, the Kingdom has begun, albeit very cautiously, to pay less attention to the restrictions of
the Arab Boycott and tentatively to explore business and investment possibilities
with Israeli entities. Generally speaking, Jews are not presently allowed to travel
or to work in the Kingdom.
33. HOLYQUR'AN3:118-9.
34. For example, the Kingdom is not a signatory to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Resolutions, part 1,
at 71, U.N. Doc. N810 (1948). Nor is the Kingdom a signatory to the 1981 U.N.
Declaration on the Elimination of All forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, G.A. Res. 36/55, U.N. GAOR, 36 Sess., Supp. No. 51,
at 171, U.N.Doc. N36151 (1981). Nor is the Kingdom a party to any of the several
international agreements a ~ o u n c i n greligious liberty or prohibiting religiously
motivated discrimination. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The Kingdom is not ashamed of this fact,
but feels instead that it has faithfully pursued the course most consistent with its
constitution-i.e., the Holy Qur'an and the sunna of the Prophet (pbuh). The Kingdom has refrained from signing or ratifying these agreements, because they are not
in accordance with Shari'a mandates, e.g., limiting the freedom of religion. A discussion of some of these limitations accompanies the hypotheticals in the text below. See, e-g., Abdul Wahab Bashir & Khaled Al-Suhail, Saudi Arabia: Shuri'a Pro& ARAB NEWS (August
tects Society and Human Rights, Naseef Says, MONEYCLIPS
2, 1993) available in WESTLAW, INT-NEWS-C database (discussing how the Consultative Assembly's Deputy Minister defends the Kingdom's Islamic stance on and
record in the area of universal human rights); Islam Guarantees Human Rights,
Says Saud, MONEYCLIPS
& THE RIYADHDAILY (June 17, 1993) avalailable in
LEMS, NEXIS Library, WIRES File (giving full text of Saudi Foreign Minister
Saud Al-Faisal's speech to the World Conference on Human Rights, a conference
which concluded in June, 1993); Dubai: Saudi Arabia Criticizes Western Media,
REUTERTEXTLINE
(May 24, 1993) available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, WIRES file
(covering Saudi Interior Minister Nayf Ibn Abd Al-Aziz's defense of the Kingdom's
human rights record, a defense which came on the heels of attacks on the Kingdom in the Western media); Dubai: Saudi Arabia Denies Human Rights Abuses,
REUTERTEXTLINE
(May 15, 1993) available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, WIRES File
(covering Saudi Interior Minister Nayf Ibn Abd Al-Aziz's denial of, inter alia, U.S.
State Department allegations of pervasive human rights violations); cf: Charles
(October 27,
Condemns Iraq, Calls for Understanding of Islam, REUTERNEWSWIRE
1993) available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, WIRES File (covering Prince Charles'
call for tolerance and understanding of Islamic faith and culture); Mustafa
& AL-AHRAMWEEKLY(NovemMahmoud, A Campaign Against Islam, MONEYCLIPS
ber 4, 1993) available in LEXIS, NEXIS Library, WIRES File (claiming that the
West, headed by the United States, is religiously using democratic and human
rights rhetoric to undermine Islam).
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One example of the extent to which the Kingdom is committed to Islam (literally to "submission" or "surrender" to the
will of Allah) and to the Islamic Shari'a, which expressly prescribes discrimination on the basis of religion, is the Kingdom's
Basic System. By way of comparison to Title VIrs stance
against religious discrimination, the Kingdom's Basic System
indicates a legal preference for Islamic doctrine, customs, and
values as well as for persons of Islamic faith. No fewer than 28
of 83 total articles in the Kingdom's Basic System express devotion and duty to Islam, its doctrines, practices, holy texts, and

All of this is not to say that the Kingdom is not committed to human rights.
The Kingdom is committed to human rights as understood in Islamic doctrine.
BASIC SYSTEM,art. 26. As examples of the Kingdom's commitment to human
rights, consider the following. The Kingdom grants political asylum in cases required to serve the public interests. Id. art. 42. The Kingdom prohibits unlawfid
searches and invasions of privacy, including offrcial entry into the home without
owner's consent or other statutory authority. Id. art. 37. The Kingdom limits confiscation, delay, reading, or listening to telegraphic, telephonic, postal and other
communications to cases specified in the regulations. Id. art. 40. The Kingdom
prohibits incommunicado and other forms of unlawful detention. Id. art. 36. The
Kingdom prohibits ex post facto criminal provisions and prosecution of crimes not
catalogued either in the Shari'a or in the regulations. Id. The Kingdom recognizes
the rights of all individuals, whether citizens of or residents in the Kingdom, to
address their public authorities, including the King and the Crown Prince. Id. art.
43. The Kingdom recognizes the rights of all individuals to litigate their claims in
the courts of the Kingdom. Id. art. 47. The Kingdom recognizes freedom of the
press ('free speech in the media'), except as limited by: express regulatory requirements; the precept of kalima tayyiba ("courteous word"); and the expectation that
the media contribute to the education of the Ummah ("nation," meaning the Islamic nation) and bolstering of the Ummah's unity. Id. art. 39 (further stating that
"[all1 acts [presumably by the media] that invite sedition or division or that are
harmful to state security and public relations or that take away from the dignity
and rights of man are forbidden"). Finally, the Kingdom recognizes the positive
rights of citizens to health care, public education, work, and, in cases of emergency, illness, or disability, to social security. Id. arts. 31, 30, 28 & 27.
The Kingdom has long been a supporter of the Arab League's several efforts to
formulate an Arab expression of human rights. A. H. ROBERTSON& J. G.
MERRILLS,HUMAN
RIGHTSIN THE WORLD:AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE STUDYOF THE
INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION
OF HUMANRIGHTS196-200 (3d ed. 1992). In the past,
the Arab League's efforts to formulate such an expression have focused largely on
Israeli human rights abuses in the Levant. More recently, the Kingdom has concerned itself with human rights abuses committed by non-Muslims against Muslims
in Hebron, Kashmir and war-torn Bosnia-Herzegovina. Should the Kingdom ever
ratify an international or regional human rights accord, the Basic System would
commit the Kingdom to abide thereby. BASICSYSTEMart. 81.
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Sha~-i'a.~~
For illustrative purposes, a brief overview of these

35. Another example of the Kingdom's profound commitment to Islam and the
Islamic Shari'a may be observed in the several Islamic limitations placed on governmental power. According to its recently promulgated Basic System, the Kingdom
is an Islamic monarchy. BASICSYSTEMarts. 1, 5-8, 44; see also AMIN, supra note
24; Jeanne Asherman, Doing Business in Saudi Arabia: The Contemporary Application of Islamic Law, 16 INT'LL. 321 (1982).
From the earliest days of its establishment, the power to govern the Kingdomhas been and continues to be vested in the King, the Protector of the Faith, the
Imam, the Keeper of the Two Holy Shrines. AMIN, supra note 24; Aba-Namay,
supra note 22; Tarazi, supra note 22; Karl, supra note 23.
The King is the origin of judicial, executive and regulatory power in the Kingdom. BASICSYSTEMart. 44. The King is also commander-in-chief of the Kingdom's
armed forces and, as such, has the power to declare states of emergency, general
mobilizations and war. Id. arts. 55, 60 & 61. Also, the King has the power to take
and to prolong "urgent measures" when the safety or territorial integrity of the
Kingdom is threatened, or when the security or other interests of its people are a t
risk. Id. art. 62.
The King's power to govern is limited in just one important respect: the King
does not and cannot make law; for, there is but one Lawmaker, and Muhammed
(pbuh) is His Prophet. See HOLYQUR'AN7:54 (stating that "[ilt was your Lord God
who created the heavens and the earth in six days and then established Himself
on the throne. [It was He that] covered the day in night, and caused the day to
follow night quickly. The sun, the moon and the stars are subject to His command.
Is it not His place to create and to command? Blessed be Allah, the Lord of the
Worlds." (emphasis added)); see also Karl supra note 23; Peter D. Sloane, The
Status of Islamic Law in the Modern Commercial World, 22 INT'L LAW743, 751-2
(1988). This proposition rules out the need for a legislature, since law-making is
not for mortals, but is exercised only by the Divine.
The King may make whatever regulations are necessary to govern the Kingdom
effectively. BASIC SYSTEMart. 55. In practice, these regulations have the force of
law, but the King's ability to make regulation is limited. Under Islamic jurisprudence, human activity falls into five basic categories: (1) activity which Holy Writ
expressly commands or requires; (2) activity about which Holy Writ expresses some
preference or recommendation; (3) activity about which Holy Writ is silent or indifferent; (4) activity about which Holy Writ expresses some aversion or reprobation;
and (5) activity which Holy Writ expressly forbids. The King's ability to regulate
human activity is generally understood to be limited to the third category. Fortunately for the King, many of the contemporary regulatory concerns of the Kingdom
(e.g., admiralty law, commerce and company law, oil and gas law, mining law,
immigration and naturalization law, tax law, and environmental law) fall largely
into this category.
If the King makes regulation contrary to divine law, as expressed in the Holy
Qur'an and the sunna ("tradition") of the Prophet (pbuh) or in other specified Islamic jurisprudential texts, then such regulation is not enforceable. AMIN, supra
note 24, at 312-3 (citing the Royal Constitutional Decree, art. 6 (1926)); see BASIC
SYSTEMarts. 7-8, 23, 25 (illustrating the constraint placed on the King's rule by
Islamic law). This discussion illustrates why it may be proper to think of the
Kingdom's system of government as an absolute monarchy. The true sovereign is
Allah, the Absolute Ruler of the Universe; the temporal King is Allah's vicegerent
on earth. Such reasoning rings true in Qur'anic verse. HOLYQUR'AN 42:49 (declaring that "[tlo Allah does the sovereignty belong, both in the heavens and on
earth"); id. 3:26 (commanding the faithful: "Declare this: 'Oh Allah, Lord of Power,
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28 articles is provided below.
The Basic System identifies "the Book of Allah," that is,
the Holy Qur'an, and the sunna of the Prophet (pbuh) as the
The Basic System declares that the
Kingdom's constituti~n.~~
power to govern arises from the and the sunna of the Prophet
(pbuh)?' The three bases of government in the Kingdom are
justice, consultation, and equality as understood in the
S h a ~ - i ' a .The
~ ~ Kingdom assumes the duty of applying the
Shari'a, of ordering that which is good, of forbidding that which
is ab~minable?~
The Basic System declares the Saudi judiciary40complete-

you give the power [to govern] to whomsoever you will and wrest that power from
whomsoever you will; you honor those who it is your pleasure to honor and humiliate those who it is your pleasure to humiliate. Indeed, over all do you have
power'"); id. 2:30 (instructing the believer: "Behold, your Lord declared to the angels: 'I will provide a vicegerent on earth' "); id. 38:26 (reminding all that "[tlhen
did we say, 'David, we make you vicegerent in the land: rule then with justice and
succumb not to lusts'").
The specified Islamic jurisprudential texts which bind the King, in addition to
the Holy Qur'an and sunna of the Prophet @buh) are: THE COMMENTARIES
ADDALIL;THE COMMENTARIES
OF AZ-ZAD; AL-BAHUTI,MANSURIBN YUNUSIBN IDRIS
AL-HANBALI
(ca. 1641 C.E.), KASHSHAFAL-QINAAN MATN AL-IKNA;AL-BAHUTI,
MANSURIBN YUNUSIBN IDRIS AL-HANBALI (ca. 1641 C.E.), SI-IARH MUTAHA ALIDARAT;
and IBN QUDAMA
AL-MAQDISI,
MUWAFFAQADDIN
ABU MUHAMMED
'ABDULLAH
BIN AHMEDBIN MUHAMMED
(ca. 1223 C.E.), AL-MUGHNI,
10 vol. (Cairo, 1970 C.E.).
If the Holy Qur'an, the sunnu of the Prophet (pbuh), or all of these five texts
fail to give a clear legal answer, then the King and the courts may recur to other
specified Hanbali legal manuals and t o the authorities of the other three main
schools of Sunni jurisprudence. AMIN, supra note 24, at 312-3 (citing the Royal
Constitutional Decree, art. 6 (1926)). In cases of sufficient extremity, if the King
steps outside the strictures of Islamic law when making regulations, the King may
be deposed. Asherman, supra note 35, at 324; see BASICSYSTEMarts. 7 & 8 (declaring the basis and source of governmental power and legitimacy in the Kingdom
to be the Holy Qur'an, the sunna of the Prophet, and Islamic Shari'a and implying
that governmental acts or decisions contrary to these undermine governmental
authority and legitimacy).
art. 1.
36. BASICSYSTEM
37. Id. art. 7.
38. Id. art. 8.
39. Id. art. 23.
40. Disquisition on the subject of the Kingdom's judiciary is beyond the scope
of this paper. The following sketch of the Kingdom's judiciary may nonetheless be
helpful in further illustrating the pervasive effect Islam has on the Kingdom. For
disquisition, see AMIN, supra note 24; Karl, supm note 23; Mark Jones, Islamic
Law in Saudi Arabia: A Responsive View, 16 INT'LJ. COMP. & APPLIEDCRIM.
JUST., No. I., 43-56 (Spring 1992); Richard N. Merenbach, Religious Law and Religious Freedom in Saudi Arabia and Israel: A Comparative Study, 12 HASTINGS
INYL & COMP.L. REV. 235-60 (1988); Richter H. Moore, Courts, Law, Justice, And
Criminal Trials in Saudi Arabia, 11 INT'LJ. COMP.& APPLIEDCRIM.JUST., No. I.,
61-7 (Spring 1992).
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The Kingdom, as prescribed by the Ministry of Justice, has a three-tiered,
inquisitorial arrangement of courts, composed of Shari'a courts, appellate Shari'a
courts and a Supreme Judicial Council. Judges at all levels in this three-tiered
arrangement are "independent" in their rulings, findings, etc., except as limited by
the Shari'a and applicable Shari'a-consistent regulations. Judges in the Kingdom
don't make law. The law exists objectively. It is decreed from on high. Judges
must confine themselves to the law as already decreed. Innovation is sorely
frowned upon.
The Kingdom's "independent" judiciary is indirectly appointed by, and answerable ultimately, to the king. BASICSYSTEMarts. 46, 50-52, 55. Upon completion of
traditional Islamic training, selected applicants for judicial appointments receive
three additional years of legal training a t the Ministry of Justice's Higher Judicial
Institute in Riyadh.
There is no provision in Shari'a law for trial by jury. There is no official or
regularly published case reporter in the Kingdom. By U.S. standards, the
Kingdom's judiciary provedes a somewhat scant set of general procedural rules.
Individual Shari'a courts do not publish local procedural rules. One reason a more
technical set of procedural rules might be less desirable is that traditionally all
litigants (except those, for example, who do not speak Arabic) represent themselves
personally, sometimes through a respected relative (usually a non-lawyer). Any
overly technical set of procedural rules could upset the Shari'a preference for selfrepresentation. Such a set of procedural rules could also disturb the substantive
concerns of the Shari'a.
The substantive rigors of the Shari'a apply to citizens of the Kingdom-Muslims-as
well as to non-citizen subjects of the Kingdom, whether Muslim
or non-Muslim.
The Shari'a courts are divided into courts of limited jurisdiction and courts of
general jurisdiction, the distinction being largely based on the gravity of offense or
the amount in controversy. For example, a Shari'a court of limited jurisdiction can
take cases involving the relatively minor Shari'a offense of intoxication (the punishment for which is flogging), but it may not hear cases calling for capital punishment or dismemberment. Such cases fall within the jurisdiction of Shari'a courts of
general jurisdiction. The Shari'a court is usually presided over by a single judge.
However, in cases calling for capital punishment or dismemberment, a three-judge
panel is required.
The Shari'a appellate court has jurisdiction of appeals brought within 15 days
of final judgment and of any and all issues raised on appeal, regardless of whether
those issues were raised in the Shari'a court. The Shari'a appellate court can summon new witnesses and has mandatory jurisdiction of appeals from decisions calling for capital punishment or dismemberment. The Shari'a appellate court may
remand cases to Shari'a courts for retrial. It may not, however, reverse Shari'a
court rulings or findings. A Shari'a court may refuse to rehear a remanded case or
to alter its ruling or finding. In this case, the Shari'a appellate court may vacate
the recalcitrant Shari'a court's rulings or findings and send the case before another
Shari'a court for retrial. The Shari'a appellate court is usually presided over by a
three-judge panel. However, a five-judge panel is necessary in order to invoke capital punishment or dismemberment. In the most serious instances, the Shari'a appellate court may choose to hear an appeal en banc. When this happens, the Supreme Judicial Council cannot review the Shari'a appellate court's decision.
The Supreme Judicial Council is the highest authority in the Kingdom's Shari'a
court system. The council is composed of a chairman, who holds the rank of minister, and ten members. This council reviews sentences involving capital punishment
or dismemberment. However, the council is not a court per se. If it disagrees with
a judgment of the Shari'a court of appeals, it merely refers judgment back to the
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ly independent in its judgments, except with respect to the demands of the Shari'a." The courts must apply the Shari'a in
accordance with the Holy Qur'an and the sunna of the Prophet
(pbuh)P2 The source of fatwa ("formal legal opinion") is the
.~~
Holy Qur'an and the sunna of the Prophet @ b ~ h ) The
courts must give force to the King's decrees, so long as those
decrees are consistent with the Holy Qur'an and the sunna of
the Prophet @ b ~ h ) . ~ ~
According to the Basic System, the King carries out policies consistent with the judgments of Islam and oversees the
The King's ministers are also reapplication of the Shz~ri'a.~~
sponsible for the implementation the Sha15'a.~~The regulatory
power must be used to pursue the best interests of the
Kingdom in accordance with the Sha15'a.~'
Under the Basic System, the Kingdom protects human
rights in conformity with the Sh~wi'a.~~
For example, no crime

Shari'a court of appeals for another hearing. The council administers the affairs of
the Shari'a court system and also addresses in fatawa ("formal legal opinions") any
questions of Shari'a law put to it by the King or the Minister of Justice.
A party to an action in any Shari'a court may approach the King uis a uis his
open door policy and petition for royal clemency, pardon or intervention. In a
sense, this makes the King's court the court of last resort in the Shari'a court
system.
In addition to the Shari'a court system and in response to the demands of
large-scale internal modernization, a sizeable foreign workforce, and voluminous
international complex commercial transactions, tribunals of special expertise have
been established. These specialized tribunals are referred to as the administrative
courts. They include the likes of a Board of Grievances to hear claims to which the
Kingdom is a party, an International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes, a Commission for the Settlement of the Commercial Disputes of Companies, and a multi-tiered Committee for the Settlement of Labor Disputes. These
administrative courts tend to have published, formal procedures. Given the formalities adhered to in these courts, it generally takes much longer for cases to clear
the docket than is true in the Shari'a court system. A well-regulated system of
voluntary arbitration is also available in the Kingdom as a vehicle for solving
commercial disputes.
In the more remote parts of the Kingdom, many of the structures described
above are not readily available. In such places, local umara' ("princes"), in addition
to their municipal functions, act as judges in common disputes.
41. Id. art. 46.
42. Id. art. 48.
43. Id. art. 45.
44. Id.
45. Id. art. 55.
46. Id. art. 57.
47. Id. art. 67.
48. Id. art. 26.

KISS OF DEATH

3991

413

may be charged, neither may punishment be assessed in the
absence of either Shari'a or other statutory a~thority.~'
The Kingdom, under the Basic System, assumes the duty
of protecting "the Islamic doctrine" and of undertaking to further the da'wa ("missionary call") t o Allah.5' The Kingdom
must maintain "Islamic values."51 The Kingdom's society is
said "to cling to the strength of Allah" and to cooperate in
bringing about al-birr ("piety").52 The Kingdom is to protect
To
Islamic heritage and contribute t o Islamic civilizati~n.~~
this end, education in the Kingdom aims at teaching the Islamic doctrine to the
Under the Basic System, the family is the foundation of
Saudi society, a society in which family members are t o be
raised on the basis of the Islamic doctrine, and in faith and
obedience to Allah and the Prophet @ b ~ h )The
. ~ ~Basic System charges every citizen of the Kingdom with the duty of defending the Islamic doctrine?
The Kingdom, as dictated by the Basic System, works
towards the fulfillment of the hopes of the Islamic U n m a h
("nation"-comprised of all Muslims every~here).~'
The Kingdom takes upon itself the duty of edifying and serving the Two
Holy Shrines-located at Mecca and Medina-and of providing
The Kingdom
safety and care during the Hajj ("~ilgrimage").~~
raises and equips the military forces with a view t o defending
the Islamic doctrine, the Two Holy Shrines:' the society and
the homeland?'
The Basic System states that the right t o succeed t o the
throne belongs to the aslah ("most righteous" or "most suitable") of the descendants of King Abd Al-Aziz Ibn Abd ArRahman Al-Faisal Al Saud?' Determining which of the approximately 500 eligible descendants is the aslah must be ac-

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

38.
23.
10.
11.
art. 29.
art. 13.
art. 9.
art. 34.
art. 25.
art. 24.
art.
art.
art.
art.

HOLYQUR'AN 9:28.
BASICSYSTEMart. 33.
Id. art. 5.
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complished in light of the teachings of the Holy Qur'an and the
sunna of the Prophet ( p b ~ h )The
. ~ ~citizen's duty of allegiance
to the King is to be understood by reference to the Holy Qur'an
and the sunna of the Prophet ( p b ~ h ) . ~ ~
The Basic System attributes the wealth of the Kingdom to
Allah.'* Property, capital, and 'aml ("work" or "labor") are personal rights which serve social ends under the Sha15'a.~~Under the Basic System, every citizen must pay zikat, a special,
religiously mandated form of "alms," and the Kingdom must
then distribute the monies collected as zikat in an appropriate
manner?
The Basic System identifies the Hegira calendar, a lunar
calendar which began July 16, 622 C.E. when the Prophet
(pbuh) took flight from Mecca t o Medina, as the Kingdom's
official ~alendar.~'
The two highest Muslim holidays, 'Aid alFitr (the breakfast feast which follows the month-long fast of
Ramadan) and 'Aid al-Adha (the day of sacrifice, a feast following the breakfast feast by about three months) are the official
state holiday^.^' The Basic System describes the Kingdom's
flag as a green field, a color reserved in the Muslim world exclusively for the descendants of the Prophet; upon that green
field are the words, la ilaha ila Allah wa Muhamrned rusul
62. Id. Each of the approximately 500 sons and grandsons of the Kingdom's
founder, King Abd Al-Aziz Ibn Abd Ar-Rahman Al-Faisal A1 Saud, is a potential
heir to the throne. Id. When the present ruler, King Fahd Ibn Abd Al-Aziz A1
Saud, passes away, the 500 or so potential heirs will convene something resembling an electoral college. Id. arts. 503) & (e) (the phrase "the act of allegiance"
apparently refers to the traditional electoral college process). From that electoral
college one of the many potential heirs will emerge as the new king. The Crown
Prince, the King's hand chosen heir apparent, does not necessarily emerge from the
electoral college as the new king. Id. art. 5(c). In fact, the role of the Crown
Prince, with respect to succession, is to serve as an interim king until such a time
as the electoral college reaches its decision regarding who will succeed to the
throne. Id. art. 5(e). Of course, whoever happens to be Crown Prince at the time of
the present king's death would arguably be in a stronger position than most other
would-be successors. This would be true for two reasons. First, the electoral college
will feel some sense of respect for or loyalty to the decedent King's Crown Prince
selection. Second, the Crown P r i n c h t e r i m King will have the powers and favors
of state at his disposal at the time the electoral college is making its decision.
63. Id. art. 6.
64. Id. art. 14.
65. Id. art. 17.
66. Id. art. 21.
67. Id. art. 2. There are only 354 days in each lunar year of the Hegira calendar; which translates to approximately 103 Anno Hegira. years to every solar
(Gregorian) century.
68. Id.
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Allah ("There is no god but Allah, and Muhammed is his
Pr~phet!").~~
As this brief overview of the Basic System indicates, the
Kingdom may be best understood in terms of a theocracy i n
which there is but one Lawgiver-Muhammed (pbuh) is His
Prohphet." The Shari'a, the divinely dictated law governs in
the vast majority of cases. The King, as temporal ruler, makes
regulations (amr or nizam), which regulations are not enforceable if inconsistent with the Shari'a. The King is subordinate to
the supreme will of Allah. Both King and Kingdom are Muslim,
"submissive." Both King and Kingdom have "surrendered" to
the Most Merciful, the Most Benevolent. I t may be safely asserted that the Kingdom is committed to Islam in a way sufficient to dispose it to discrimination on the basis of religion.
ILLUSTRATING
THE INADEQUACIES
IV. THREEHYPOTHETICALS
OF THE FOREIGNLAW EXCEPTION
A. May a U.S. Employer Invoke the Foreign Law Exception
to Prevent a U.S. Employee Working Abroad
from Violating Foreign Law ?
Suppose that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia contracts with
a U.S. helicopter company to provide support to the Kingdom
in connection with the yearly religious pilgrimage of millions of
Muslims to Islam's Two Holy Shrines a t Mecca and Medina.?'
According to the contract, the helicopter company's will have
two primary missions: first, to provide general pilgrimage route
surveillance; second, to assist in fighting the periodic tent fires
that erupt along the pilgrimage route.72
In order to get the job done right, the company sets up
operational centers in three key Saudi cities-the capitol city of
Riyadh, the Arab Gulf city of Dhahran, and the Red Sea city of
Jedda. Each of these operational centers will service a length of
the pilgrimage route. Only the operational center in Jedda will

69. Id. art. 3. This expression, known commonly as the shahadu or "testimony," is the first of the Five Pillars of Islam, and is the one confession required of
every Muslim.
70. See COULSON,
supra note 24, at 9-20 (describing the concept of Islamic
legislation and lawmaking).
71. This hypothetical is based loosely on Kern v. Dynalectron Corp., 577 F.
Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
72. The pilgrims-many of whom are city folk-sometimes build fires too close
to their tents, occasionally resulting in tent fires.
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service sections of the pilgrimage route located within the area
of the Two Holy Shrines. This is important, because the area of
the Two Holy Shrines is haram (forbidden) for non-Muslims.
Non-Muslims who trespass the haram of the Two Holy Shrines
commit capital trespass, that is, trespass punishable by beheading.
I n order to prevent its pilots (most of whom are non-Muslim, U.S. citizens) from themselves trespassing the haram of the
Two Holy Shrines, the helicopter company adopts an ostensibly
Title VII-violative policy of requiring pilots in its Jeddah office
to be Muslims or, if not already Muslims, to convert to Islam.
The reasons for adopting this policy seem obvious enough: to
avoid risking the heads of its pilots and to avoid annoying royal
sensitivities or irritating the Muslim community. But, despite
these reasons, the company cannot say that Saudi law requires
the adoption of such a policy. For, in fact, it does not. The helicopter company would not itself break any Saudi law by declining to adopt such a policy for Title VII reason^.'^ Nonetheless,
the helicopter company adopts the policy, thereby raising this
question: does the foreign law exception apply to the helicopter
company's Title VII-violative Islamic conversion policy, even
though the helicopter company would itself violate no foreign
law by declining to adopt that policy? Or, more abstractly, may
a U.S. employer implement Title VII-violative policies or practices with the blessing of the foreign law exception in order to
prevent its U.S. employees from themselves breaking the laws
of the foreign country in which they work, even when the U.S.
employer would not itself be in violation of the foreign country's
laws by declining to adopt such policies or practices?
Looking at Title VII's plain language-non-compliance with
Title VII is lawful, if compliance would cause the U.S. employer
to break the laws of the foreign country in which the U.S. emit
that the foreign law exception does
ployee ~ o r k s ~ ~ -appears
not apply to the helicopter company's Title VII-violative conversion policy. For if the company complies with Title VII by refraining from adopting the religiously discriminatory policy, it
73. In Dynalectron, 577 F. Supp. at 1196, the facts were as described above,
when Mr. Wade Kern, a Christian of the Baptist denomination, contracted (albeit
indirectly) to fly helicopters for Dynalectron in the Kingdom. Mr. Kern's assignment was to the Jeddah office. In order to start work there, company policy required that he convert to Islam. When he refused to convert, however, he was sent
back to the United States. No conversion to Islam meant no job.
74. 42 U.S.C. 3 2000e-l(b) (Supp. 1992).
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does not itself violate the laws of the Kingdom. Additionally, a
prospective violation of the foreign country's law, in this case
violation of the law of the Kingdom, is what the foreign law
exception expressly requires. If the helicopter company, instead
of adopting the religiously discriminatory Islamic conversion
policy, were to comply with the religious nondiscrimination
requirements of Title VII, it would merely be leaving open the
possibility that one of its U.S. employees (specifically, one of its
non-Muslim pilots working out of the Jedda office) could unlawfully fly over Islam's Two Holiest Shrines, thereby committing
capital trespass. But why shouldn't the helicopter company be
allowed to take some measures, even if religiously discriminatory, to prevent the potential disaster of sending home the
beheaded remains of an haram-trespassing pilot?
Assuming it desires to perform its contract with the Kingdom, the helicopter company has two alternatives at this j u n o
ture. First, it could argue that the foreign law exception applies. It could make a good faith, albeit risky, argument that
because of the intimate relationship between the company's
enterprise (servicing the Two Holy Shrines area of the Kingdom) and the potential unlawful activities of its non-Muslim,
Jedda office pilots (violating the Two Holy Shrines area of the
Kingdom), the company's failure to adopt and execute a conversion policy would be tantamount to violating the law of the
Kingdom. Of course, such an argument might require the company to make some showing that Saudi law provides for vicarious corporate criminal liability with respect to violation of the
Two Holy Shrines. The Kingdom's law apparently makes no
such provision. Criminal liability i n the case described above
would lie only against natural persons. And, in any case, such
a n argument would require stretching the language of the
foreign law exception; something the helicopter company
shouldn't bank on a court's being willing to do. After all, the
courts have only grudgingly recognized the other main exception to Title VII, the BFOQ exception.75 Why would the helicopter company expect the courts to allow a liberal construction
of the foreign law exception?
Second, the helicopter company could admit that the foreign law exception doesn't apply and argue instead that its
75. Dothand v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 355 (1977) (stating that the BFOQ
exception is "an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition against
discrimination").
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conversion policy fits the requirements of the BFOQ exception? Since the Kingdom, on pain of death, forbids non-Muslims from entering the haram of the Two Holy Shrines, being a
Muslim could rightly be called a necessary occupational qualification for working in, around and-in the case of helicopter
pilots--over that haram. Being a Muslim is, in this case, more
than a mere business convenience. The lives and safety of nonMuslim U.S. employees are a t stake, to say nothing of the
helicopter company's business viability in the Kingdom. This
line of argument doesn't require stretching the language of the
foreign law exception. But it also doesn't take account of the
U.S. employer-employee, master-servent, principle-agent relationship in matters of violating foreign law, nor does it offer the
helicopter company much assurance; for, as already indicated,
the courts seldom acknowledge the BFOQ e~ception.~'

B. May a U.S. Employer Discriminate Against a U S .
Employee Within the Territorial Boundaries of the United
States in Order to Avoid Violating the Law of the
Foreign Country in Which the U.S. Employee
Works or Is to Be Stationed?
Suppose now that a private U.S. medical school specializing in organ transplants makes special arrangements with the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to station and to maintain an organ
transplant surgical team a t one of the royal hospitals in Ri~ a d h . ?The
~ medical school has two purposes for taking this
action: first, the medical school wiU be able to provide a needed
service to the Kingdom; second, the medical school will be able
to expose its surgeons to a larger number of transplants than
would otherwise be possible.
Of course, the medical school makes participation in the
Saudi program completely voluntary. But, given the opportunities created by being able to perform an extraordinarily high
number of transplants while in the Kingdom, participation in
76. Id. at 1199-1203; see supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text. The court
in Kern seemed somewhat surprised that Dynaledron failed to make this argument, although it was available at the time. See Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours,
Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976); Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 499 F.2d 859
(7th Cir. 1974) (both cases allowing the BFOQ defense in order to protect third
parties).
77. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 355.
78. This hypothetical is a distillation of Abrams v.Baylor College of Medicine,
805 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1986).
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the program quickly becomes a career "must" for doctors at the
medical school. Soon a consistent pattern develops a t the medical school whereby those doctors who participate i n the Saudi
program are promoted earlier and given greater responsibilities
than those who "choose" not to participate. In this way, the
program becomes something less than "voluntary."
I t is a t this point that problems begin to arise. The medical
school receives Saudi program applications from two very qualified Jewish doctors. Since the medical school is not in the habit
of making religion a n issue in its employment policies and
practices, it tentatively accepts the Jewish doctors into the
program. Some time later, however, the medical school recalls
that the Kingdom does not grant work visas to Jewish persons.
Not wanting to upset its special relationship with the Kingdom,
the medical school then decides not to advance the employer
clearance necessary for the Jewish doctors' Saudi work visas.
Effectively, the medical school eliminates the Jewish doctors
from the Saudi program. Soon enough, the Jewish doctors learn
the reason for the medical school's action and file Title VII
charges with the EEOC. Can the medical school successfully
claim the foreign law exception to Title VII as a defense to the
Jewish doctors' charge? Will the foreign law exception apply to
a U.S. employer's discriminatory, Title VII-violative acts which
take place entirely within the territorial borders of the United
States, but which nonetheless are aimed at preventing the
violation of the laws of the foreign country where the U.S.
employee works or is to be stationed??' Unfortunately, the for-

79. The anecdote which I related in the introduction to this Comment about
my friend's Middle Eastern job-hunting raises this same question, since my friend's
job interview (and potentially any Title VII discrimination involved in that interview) occurred entirely within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.
If the set of fads given in this hypothetical are not enough to codbse the
issue of whether the foreign law exception applies, a number of more confounding
iterations of this same scenario (the "non-extraterritorial extraterritorial application"
scenario) can easily be envisioned. The religiously motivated effective elimination of
the Jewish doctors from the Saudi program could have been made by the organ
transplant team coordinator (an employee of the medical school) in Riyadh, making
it so that the discriminatory act occurred without the territorial jurisdiction and,
arguably, within the protection of the foreign law exception. Or, in my friend's
situation, the job interview could have taken place over the phone, with the interviewer (turned Title VII discriminator) being located in the Kingdom while my
friend was at his home in Provo, Utah. Or, what might have happened, had the
medical school made its discriminatory decision offshore, but in a country which
didn't legally require such a decision, about U.S. employees presently located in the
United States, but who were (like our Jewish doctors) to be stationed in a country
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eign law exception does not provide answers or guidance to the
medical school. And, the same could be said for the BFOQ
exception.80
So, what is the U.S. medical school to do? Assuming the
Jewish doctors choose not to reveal their religious convictions
on their visa applications, should the medical school endorse
the visa applications of the Jewish doctors without revealing
the doctors' religious background? Or, should the medical
school violate U.S. equal employment law by failing-on religious grounds alone-to allow the Jewish doctors to participate
in the career-essential program?
Besides being antithetical t o good foreign relations, the
first option will, if discovered, jeopardize the medical school's
opportunity t o send other doctors to the Kingdom. The second
option is similarly undesirable. It places the medical school in
the odious position of either (1) denying the applications of all
qualified Jewish doctors and facing indefensible Title VII discrimination charges, (2) denying the applications of all qualified Jewish doctors and fabricating non-discriminatory reasons
in defense for so doing, (3) discriminating against Jewish doctors in a more discrete, subtle way, probably in the initial hiring process, or (4) terminating its highly beneficial relationship
with the royal hospital in Riyadh. Whatever option the medical
school chooses in this case, it is plain that the foreign law exception, which could and probably should have been structured
t o give guidance in such situations, is thoroughly unhelpful.
A third option may be available to the U.S. medical school:
it could grant the Jewish doctors' applications and leave the direct discrimination t o the Saudi consulate. This solution may
work. It avoids the rigors of Title VII and maintains good relations with the Kingdom; presuming, that is, that the Saudi

that did require that decision? The answer to questions such as this one is that,
as of yet, there is no answer. No case law on this point has developed. However,
it seems appropriate here to pose the possibility that the foreign law exception will
not apply in "nonextraterritorial extraterritorial application" cases. Courts may be
unwillingly to play cat and mouse with the situs of international employment discrimination. Furthermore, this s i t w analysis would seem to allow, if not encourage,
U.S.employers to travel the globe, when desirable, in order to discriminate against
certain classes of employees or potential employees.
80. The same could probably be said of the BFOQ exception. One reason for
believing that the courts would not be willing to apply the foreign law exception in
%on-extraterritorial extraterritorial application" cases is that the courts are accustomed to interpreting the BFOQ exception-one of the only other exceptions to
Title VII in a very restrictive way. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
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consulate won't mind perhaps constantly having to play the
bad guy on the medical school's behalf.
There are a t least two problems with this third option.
First, it operates on the faulty assumption that the medical
school wants to sacrifice some of its best doctors to the expediencies of the Saudi program-that the medical school wants to
discriminate. The opposite is more likely to be true. The medical school would likely want the best of its doctors, regardless
of religious background, to be among those who receive the
benefits of the Saudi program. Second, this last option is only
applicable in the unique situation suggested by this particular
hypothetical-situations where the U.S. employer has some
foreign governmental agency to hide behind. But what of situations such as the one described in the opening anecdote, where
the U.S. employer pursues a Title VII-violative employment
policy or practice in the United States in order to avoid violation of foreign country law with no willing foreign governmental agency to hide behind? In the opening anecdote, the U.S.
firm was seeking to avoid a possible violation of foreign antiproselyting law. Other than merely potentially implicated foreign law, the U.S. firm would have no place to hide.

C. Should the Foreign Law Exception Take Account Not Only
of Foreign "Law"but also of Significant Non-Legal
Factors such as Prevailing Culture, Moral
and Traditional Expectations?
Suppose that a Lebanese-American by the name of Bashir
works for a U.S. based multinational enterprise with branch
offices in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia." After several years experience working in this company's U.S. offices, Bashir requests a
transfer to the company's Dhahran offices. Sometime after his
transfer-request is granted, Bashir moves with his family to
Dhahran.
When Bashir goes to work for the first time after arriving
in the Kingdom, a Saudi superior notices that Bashir is wearing a small crucifm. When the superior cautiously points out to
Bashir the inappropriateness of wearing this Christian symbol
to work, Bashir objects, telling the Saudi superior that i n all

81. This hypothetical is genuinely hypothetical, although its facts may in
some remote ways resemble those of Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v
Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
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the years he's worked for the company he's never heard of any
company policy prohibiting the wear of religious symbols. The
Saudi superior, trying not to be defensive, gently explains to
Bashir the prohibition against wearing or otherwise displaying
non-Muslim religious symbols is local company policy aimed at
keeping good relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in
the office as well as between the company and the predominantly Muslim local community and clientele. Wishing to avoid
a scene and not wanting to be on his new superior's bad side,
Bashir removes his crucifix, and returns to work.
For several months following this incident, Bashir doesn't
wear his crucifix to work. During this time, Bashir's Muslim coworkers befriend Bashir. Soon enough, Bashir feels a t ease in
his new work environment. Slowly, but subtly, however,
Bashir's new friends begin to "pressure" him about religious
matters. "Come to noon prayer with us, Bashir. You are Arab,
you believe in God. Come on." Of course, Bashir's Muslim coworkers mean Bashir no harm-in their view they are doing
him an eternal favor. Bashir, nevertheless, begins to feel increasingly defensive about his religious convictions.
The whole matter comes to something of a head, however,
for Bashir on the day he arrives a t work and finds a copy of the
Holy Qur'an sitting on his desk. Bashir takes the book to his
Saudi superior and asks that such religious items not be placed
on his desk. When his Saudi superior, in Bashir's view, responds indifferently to this request, Bashir makes a decision.
The next day, Bashir comes to work wearing his crucifix. A
confrontation occurs. Bashir quits before his Saudi superior can
fire him. Bashir, now unemployed, returns with his family to
the United States.
Shortly after returning to the United States Bashir files a
Title VII charge with the EEOC. The company responds and
invokes the foreign law exception, arguing, inter alia, that even
if local company policy prohibiting wear of non-Muslim religious symbols is not motivated by a n express Saudi law requiring such a policy, it is motivated by a Basic System concern.
The Kingdom's Basic System, the company points out, requires
non-citizen residents to "observe the values of the Saudi society
and respect its traditions and feeling^,"'^ something Bashir
failed to do when he wore a crucifix to work that second time.

82. BASICSYSTEM art. 41.
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In the face of this set of hypothetical facts, a court might
follow one of the following approaches. First, a court might say
that the foreign law exception does not apply absent some specific law requiring companies to prohibit employees from wearing or otherwise displaying non-Muslim religious symbols. A
court taking this position might argue that the Values, Traditions and Feelings Clause of Article 41 is overly broad and does
not march up to U.S. or international standards of legality.
Moreover, a court taking this position might reason that, if
allowed so easily to negate Title VII duties in this case, the
Values, Traditions and Feelings Clause could be used by other
U.S. employers of U.S. employees in the Kingdom to justify
almost any Title VII-violative policies. Although this position
has some persuasive power, it is not the only tenable position.
And, it may be an undesirable position in so far as it presumes
that the only kind of "law" is the kind we are used to.
Second, a court might take the opposite position, holding
that the foreign law exception does apply; in effect, holding
that the company's otherwise Title VII-violative policy of disallowing its employees from wearing or otherwise displaying nonMuslim religious paraphernalia was -aimed at complying with
the Values, Traditions and Feelings Clause. Support for this
position could be taken from other provisions of the Kingdom's
Basic System which make it a state dutys3 and the duty of
every Saudi citizens4 to defend the Islamic doctrine-a doctrine which regards a s a "monstrous" blasphemy the Christian
belief that Jesus Christ (pbuh) was the son of Gods5 and as
fiction the New Testament account of the crucifixion of Jesus
Christ (pbuh)? A court taking this second position might
agree with the first position: that the company's Title VII-violative policy was not intended to prevent the company from
breaking any 'law" in the U.S. or international meaning of the
term. But a t this point, the court would go on to say that, because the policy was intended to foster compliance with the
command of the Values, Traditions and Feelings Clause, the
foreign law exception to Title W does apply. The position here
would be, in effect, that, if it is "law" for the Kingdom, it's law
for the purposes of the foreign law exception. The Kingdom,

83. Id. art. 33.
84. Id. art. 34.
85. HOLYQUR'AN 19:88-92.
86. HOLYQUR'AN 4:157-8.
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after all, very consciously chose to adopt the Values, Traditions
and Feelings Clause along with 28 other Basic System articles
expressing duty and devotion to Islam. By consciously adopting
the Shari'a as its constitution, the Kingdom consciously adopted a religiously discriminatory legal framework and, therefore,
U.S. employers of U.S. employees working in the Kingdom
should be given broad latitude to function within that framework, even if this means allowing such employers to discriminate in ways that would not be tolerated at home.
But these two approaches only hint at a larger problem.
The foreign law exception does not respect or give deference to
prevailing culture, morality or tradition i n foreign countries,
apparently even if such carries the weight of law. If it did, this
hypothetical would likely be meaningless. By not giving such
respect, by failing to defer to applicable prevailing foreign custom and practice, Title VII requires that U.S. employers disregard such. In this respect, Title VII is culturally insensitive, if
not imperialistic. In fact, one might wonder what would happen
if the shoe were on the other foot; if the Kingdom was in the
business, say, of making Saudi employers insure the religious
purity of their expatriate Saudi employees working in the United States; of requiring Saudi employers to insure that their
female Saudi employees and spouses of male Saudi employees
wore the veil and that no Saudi employees, male or female,
become Americanized. To be sure, we would find such a policy
to be a n intolerable imposition on our tolerant society.

This Comment has pointed out three difficulties in applying the foreign law exception to Title VII. First, the exception
contemplates cases where a U.S. employer adopts Title VIIviolative policies affecting expatriate U.S. employees with the
aim of personally complying with the law of the foreign country
i n which the U.S. employees work, but fails to contemplate the
U.S. employer's occasional compelling need to adopt Title VIIviolative policies in order to discourage its expatriate U.S. employees from themselves violating foreign country law. Second,
the exception provides the courts no direction regarding whether, and to what extent, the exception ought to be applied i n
cases where U.S. employers pursue Title VII-violative policies
and practices within the territory of the United States with the
sole intent of complying with the law of the foreign country
where affected U.S. employees work or are to be stationed.
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Third, the exception presumes that the only foreign country
concerns worthy of Title VII exception are legal concerns. This
overlooks the reality that other countries express values worthy
of legislative or judicial concern i n the United States in very
non-legal terms--other countries might have non-legal functional equivalents to what we regard as law.
Tentative legislative solutions to problems one and three
may prove the easiest to formulate. As to problem one, it might
be suggested that the language of the foreign law exception be
refrarned as follows:
I t shall not be unlawful [under the sections of Title VII which
regulate employment practices] for an employer (or a corporation controlled by an employer), labor organization, employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining (including
on-the-job training programs) to take any action otherwise
prohibited by such section, with respect to an employee in a
workplace in a foreign country if compliance with such section
would cause such employer (or such corporation), such organization, such agency, or such committee to violate the law of
the foreign country in which such workplace is located. Such
employer (or such corporation), such organization, such agency, or such committee may also recur to this exception, when
taking actions reasonably calculated and intended solely to
discourage such employee from violating the law of the foreign
country where the workplace is located."

As to problem three, it might be suggested that the language of the foreign law exception be redrafted as follows:
It shall not be unlawful [under the sections of Title VII which
regulate employment practices] for an employer (or a corporation controlled by an employer), labor organization, employment agency or joint labor-management committee controlling
apprenticeship or other training or retraining (including onthe-job training programs) to take any action otherwise prohibited by such section, with respect to an employee in a
workplace in a foreign country if compliance with such section
would cause such employer (or such corporation), such organization, such agency, or such committee to violate the law of or
the functional equivalent of law in the foreign country in
which such workplace is located. Functional equivalents of

87. 42

U.S.C.$ 2000e-l(b) (Supp. 1992) (suggested revisions in italics).
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law in a foreign country may include overwhelmingly pervasive cultural, moral, or traditional custom or practice.88

As to problem two, no easy solution seems readily apparent. Conflicts of law doctrines could prove useful in solving the
localization. But such doctrines vary from state to state and,
therefore, uniformity of result will suffer. If nothing else, however, the localization doctrines found in the corpus of conflicts
of law may serve as a well-considered starting point for congressional inquiry into the solution of this problem. But the
consideration of the conflicts aspects of this problem are sadly
beyond the scope of this Comment.

LAWEXCEPTION
VI. CONCLUSION:
THE FOREIGN
Is Too NARROWLY
DRAWN
Title VII applies extraterritorially to U.S. employers of
expatriate U.S. employees, except when compliance with Title
VII would cause the U.S. employer to violate the law of the
foreign country in which the U.S. employees work.
This foreign law exception fails to fulfill its intended functions, not the least of which is the protection of U.S. employers
of U.S. employees abroad from "Catch 22" s i t u a tions--situations where, on the one hand, compliance with
foreign country law means failure to comply with Title VII and,

88. Id. (suggested revisions in italics). Assuming the suggested solutions to
problems one and three were simultaneously adopted, the solution to problem one
would need to be further adjusted as follows:
Such employer (or such corporation), such organization, such agency, such
committee may also recur to this exception when taking such actions, so
long as such actions are reasonably calculated and intended solely to
discourage such employee from violating the law of or the functional
equivalent of law in the foreign country where the workplace is located.
Id. (suggested revision in italics).
The author would also add the following modifications clarifjing the scope and
operation of the reformulation:
For the purposes of this section, determinations respecting any such functional equivalents of foreign law may be made on judicial notice taken on
the same grounds and in the same manner as is the case with foreign
law. The mere presence of law or a legal system in the foreign country
will not necessarily preclude recurrence to a functional equivalent under
this section, unless such law or legal system is patently contrary to the
imputed functional equivalent.
Other rational reformulations of the exception could, of course, be conceived.
The author does not suppose these suggested reformulations to be anything more
than a first effort at reformulation.
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on the other hand, compliance with Title VII means failure to
comply with foreign country law. The foreign law exception
fails in this regard because it is overly simplistic. It incorrectly
assumes that international discriminatory conduct happens
either here or there. I t naively fails to contemplate the problem
of localizing international discriminatory conduct.
The exception fails, because it does not indicate whether
the U.S. employer may invoke the exception to prevent U.S.
employees from violating the laws of the foreign country i n
which they work. The exception presumes that the only conduct
which U.S. employers have a vested interest in regulating is
their own, and not that of their expatriate U.S. employees. This
failure puts U.S. employers of U.S. employees abroad in the
uncomfrotable position of not knowing when the exception will
apply and when it will not.
Finally, the foreign law exception fails, because it contemplates only foreign legal concerns as concerns worthy of Title
VII exception; it fails to respect even the most significant foreign cultural, moral, traditional concerns, thus creating the
specter of cultural imperialism. Of course, one could argue the
desirability of making U.S. employers bite the bullet abroad
and apply Title VII, even when giving offense is the result. The
point of Title VII is, or so the argument would go, the guarantee of what are internationally recognized human and civil
rights. In the hypotheticals examined above, for example, the
right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of religion is
a right of this genre. On the other hand, by reaching beyond
our borders and into the borders of the Kingdom, even into the
haram of the Two Holy Shrines, perhaps Title VII violates one
of its own highest values-the value of being religiously tolerant. Could it be that vis a vis its extraterritorial application,
Title VII exposes a n even higher form of intolerance? One
might call it, the intolerance of the tolerant.

James David Phipps

